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Imagination and harmony in Leibniz's philosophy of language

Meine Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Sprachphilosophie von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Leibniz vertritt zwei Thesen: (1) es gibt keine Form von Denken ohne die Anwendung irgendeiner Art von Zeichen; (2) Menschen haben die Tendenz, sich vermöge der Imagination vorzustellen, das, was der Imagination nicht unterworfen ist, d.h. Begriffe, die ihren Ursprung im Intellekt haben. Auf diesen beiden Thesen begründet Leibniz seine Sprachphilosophie. In meiner Dissertation zeige ich, dass diese Thesen auf Leibniz’ Metaphysik und Kognitionstheorie beruhen. Eine Analyse der Leibniz’schen Theorie der Sprachentstehung und Entwicklung aus diesem Blickwinkel ermöglicht es, zu erklären, inwiefern Leibniz eine wechselseitige Entwicklung von Sprache und Denken vertreten hat. Die Denkfähigkeit wird entwickelt, indem ein grammatikalisch und semantisch geregeltes Zeichensystem angewendet wird, d.h. eine natürliche Sprache.

Titel: Imagination and harmony in Leibniz's philosophy of language
Verfasser: Oliveri, Lucia GND
Gutachter: Meier-Oeser, Stephan GND
Dokumenttyp: Dissertation/Habilitation
Medientyp: Text
Erscheinungsdatum: 2016
Publikation in MIAMI: 15.03.2019
Datum der letzten Änderung: 09.08.2019
Schlagwörter: Leibniz; Sprachphilosophie; Imagination; Harmonie; Begriffe; angeborene Ideen; Nouveaux Essais
Fachgebiete: Philosophie
Lizenz: CC BY 4.0
Sprache: Englisch
Format: PDF-Dokument
URN: urn:nbn:de:hbz:6-05169689910
Permalink: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:hbz:6-05169689910
Onlinezugriff:
Inhalt:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT V
INTRODUCTION VII
THOUGHT AND JUDGMENT 1
1.1. Sketching the Problems of Nouveaux Essais: Some Preliminaries 3
1.1.1. About Ideas before Locke: Old Solutions to New Problems? 10
1.2. Leibniz‘s Arguments Against Locke 17
1.2.1. Leibniz as Interpreter of Locke 18
1.2.2. On the Distinction Between Ideas, Concepts, and Actual Thoughts 26
1.2.3. Actual Thoughts and the Distinction Between Perceptions and Concepts 29
1.2.4. The Process of Judging 34
1.2.5. Leibniz on Deceptive States and Error 41
1.2.6. Conclusion 45
1.3. Apperception, Reflection, and Consciousness 47
1.3.1. The Puzzle of Apperception 51
1.3.2. The Relation between Action and Perceptual activity: Putting it in Context 56
1.3.3. The Structure of Animal Action 61
1.3.4. Animal and Human Knowledge: Two Different Species of Knowledge 75
1.3.5. Instincts and Habits 80
1.3.6. Conclusion 83
1.4. The I-Perspective 85
1.4.1. Reflection 87
1.4.2. Descartes‘ Cogito as Truth of Fact and Consciousness 90
1.4.3. Leibniz‘s Criticism of Locke‘s Theory of Consciousness 95
1.4.4. Minute Perceptions and the Self 100
1.4.5. The I-Perspective: Conclusion 105
1.5. From the I- to the I-Thou Perspective 107
1.5.1. Aquinian Roots of Leibnitian conscientia 109
1.5.2. Conscientia as Social Knowledge 116
1.5.3. Ruling out Solipsism: Conscientia as Source of Social Knowledge 118
1.5.4. Commercium mentium 127
1.5.5. Conclusion 133
CONCEPTS AND IDEAS 135
2.1. Leibniz‘s Theory of Concepts 137
2.1.1. On the Cognitive Role of Signs and Imagination 137
2.1.2. The Priority of Thought over Language: Leibniz as Innatist 145
2.1.3. Leibniz as an Extreme Innatist? 148
2.1.4. Leibniz‘s Commitment to the Variety of the Stimulus Argument 158
2.2. Concepts as Possibilities 165
2.2.1. The Chimerical Character of Locke‘s Ideas 165
2.2.2. Concepts as Possibilities and Finite Minds‘ Mathematization of the World 171
2.2.3. An Axiomatic Approach to Truths: Intensional Interpretation of Concepts 177
2.2.4. Typicality Effects: Between Psychological and Logical Use of Concepts 179
2.2.5. Essences and Beings 185
2.2.6. Leibniz‘s Conceptualism and the Necessity of the Ideas in God‘s Intellect 192
2.2.7. Necessary Truths and Truths of Facts 201
2.2.8. Conclusion 210
2.3. Ideas as Constraints on Thought 211
2.3.1. Concepts as abilities or dispositions 211
2.3.2. Dispositions and Leibniz‘s Theory of Substance 218
2.3.3. Dispositions to Truths and Ideas 221
2.3.4. Spontaneity and Self-Determination. 224
2.3.5. Innate Ideas as Constraints on Thought 231
2.3.6. Logical and Historical Order of Truths 234
2.3.7. Conclusion 238
THE MUTUAL DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 239
3.1. Constraints on Thought and Language: The Place of The Other 241
3.1.1. The Analogy between Mind and Body 241
3.1.2. Constraints on Thought and Language 244
3.1.3. Experiencing Other Minds and General Concepts 251
3.1.4. Innate Ideas and Generality 257
3.1.5. Innate Ideas and the Acquisition of Moral and Metaphysical Concepts 267
3.1.6. Conclusion: What is the Place of Harmony in All This? 271
3.2. The origins of languages 275
3.2.1. Blind Thoughts and Language Origins: Towards Articulated Sounds 276
3.2.2. Interjections 282
3.2.3. Etymology and Imagination 285
3.2.4. The Role of Blind Thoughts in Reasoning. A Case Study: Preposition 292
3.2.5. Constraints on Thought and Language Origins 298
3.2.6. Conclusion 308
CONCLUSION 309
BIBLIOGRAPHY 315